中肯，理智的评论：走出“六四”悲剧的阴影

来源: 民族之林 于

要学会走出“六四”阴影

《联合早报》2009

● 张汉音　作者曾在新加坡任教，目前是台湾辅仁大学社会学系教授与系主任

　
　二十年前中国大陆的六四事件是一个政治悲剧，是一个需要吸取教训、但应该走出其阴影。

　　一批满腔热血、希望国家通过政治变革走向美好未来的学生，由于对国情和世界情势缺乏深刻的理解，不懂得中国在现在这个阶段不适宜採用西方式的自由与民主政治制度，也不懂得西方式的自由与民主制度未必就是最理想的制度，结果，在国内政治制度的某些弊病的刺激下，在胡耀邦逝世的悲情冲动下，决定以悼念胡耀邦逝世为动员旗帜，通过大游行，来宣示主张立即引入西式自由的政治诉求。

　　他们的行动兴奋了西方世界的神经。在西方反华势力的大规模 “声援”下，学运的核心分子受到了鼓舞。他们把最初要求为胡耀邦“平反”，改为高悬“打倒邓小平”的横幅，更在天安门广场耸立起象徵美国制度的自由女神之像；并且把学运拉上了与民主政治相违背的不妥协之路，“不达目的，誓不罢休”。主张中止绝食示威和撤离天安门广场的学运领袖被撤换，整个学运和不了解大局的数十万市民同情者，被操纵在客观上与外国反华势力相呼应的几个头脑简单的极端分子的手中。如是便导生了一次完全超乎执政党预料之外的严重政治危机。

如果激进民主派的愿望得以实现

　　中国的近代历史和苏联的解体历史告诉我们，激进民主派所主张的在现阶段照抄西方式自由制度的愿望一旦实现，或者纵然只是戈巴乔夫类型的主张在当时和现在的中国获得实施，中国所得到的就不是善良的学生们以及善良的国内支持者们所想像的那种社会自由、政治民主、官员廉洁和国家全面发展，而是国内战争、国家裂解和经济大倒退，如同前苏联那样。

　　苏联解体之后，从1991年到20世纪末，俄罗斯国内生产总值比1990年下降52%（1941年至1945年的战争期间仅仅下降22%）；卢布贬值，物价飞涨五千多倍；俄罗斯人均预期寿命下降了4岁。此外，在俄罗斯阻止车臣独立的战争中，死亡人数达数万人之多，俄国与格鲁吉亚交战期间又有数千人亡命于枪弹之下。

　　可以断言，中国如果被极端民主派导入前苏联的覆辙，除了国家的分崩离析与国际地位的一落千丈，中国在经济和人的生命方面所蒙受的灾难一定不会小于俄国。

　　不仅如此。韦伯（Max Weber）曾经指出，任何大国都不希望自己的邻国强大，担心邻国的强大会挑战和威胁他自己的强者地位。这是百年之前的论点。由于当今地球村的时空压缩，那时的邻国和现在的邻国已经不是一个概念。在当今的时代，美国或西欧的某些国家不喜欢中国复兴强大已经如同他们不喜欢地理邻国强大一样，再加上这些国家向来笃信弱肉强食的强霸逻辑，所以从冷战时代开始，直到二十一世纪的今天，除了在冷战后期需要联华制苏而有所收敛之外，美国一直没有放弃过牵制和抑制中国的发展，没有放弃过以人权和民主的名义去支持达赖喇嘛以及留住美国的中国极端民主派、极端自由派，支持中国国内的异议分子，希望他们在某个时候能够扮演推翻中国执政党和分裂中国国土的角色。

　　法国虽然与美国有别，但是从萨科奇总统和巴黎市长支持达赖喇嘛的做法，我们也不难看到他们的用心。这些国家的这种黑黑的一面，可以解释为什么在六四之前，美国和西欧会有那麽强大的势力要为天安门广场上的反政府抗争擂鼓呐喊，并且提供资金援助。这些事实也可以帮助我们作出这样的合理推断：即使在中国裂解之后，他们仍然不会就此罢手，他们还会像对付俄国和南斯拉夫那样，进一步挤压中国和操弄中国内部的亲西方势力以及其他破坏势力，以尽可能多地牺牲中国利益的方式来断除中国将来作为大国而崛起的可能性。

邓小平的“壮士断臂”决策

　　在此次学运期间，时任总理的李鹏曾经与学生代表谈判，劝学生以大局为重撤离天安门广场，结束示威活动，但是没有成功。时任总书记的赵紫阳去广场看望学生，劝他们停止绝食，也没有成功。政府宣布戒严，依然没有成功。

　　于是中国的执政党便面临一个极其困难的选择：要么答应学运的要求，立即实行美国式的言论自由制度，让邓小平下台，其实也是让共产党下台，任由激进的民主派和自由派把中国引入万丈深渊；要么採用暴力对极端分子实行镇压，但是极端分子混在无辜和不明大局的学生与市民之中，受到后者的保护，採用暴力必然会伤害无辜，决策者会为此而付出沉重的政治代价。

　　这是一种没有赢、只有输的决择，是一个究竟要顺水推舟、选择大输、抑或是逆势而动、选择小输的抉择。

　　邓小平是一个具有超凡睿智与洞察力的政治家，也是一个具有卓越务实精神和超强政治意志力的政治家。他不像戈巴乔夫那样天真。他也懂得中国还暂时不能满足民众的一些理想主义的期待，像美国那样开放媒体和其他许多公共场合的言论自由，因为他看得到常人看不到的后果：现在的中国一旦完全开放言论自由，西方反华势力必然会乘机而入，西藏、新疆和内蒙的分裂主义分子必然会乘机而起，中国必然会分崩离析，经济改革必然会半途而废，中国必然会再一次被远远地抛在世界主流的发展历史之外。

　　事实上，此次学运恰好显示，目前的中国只要稍稍放开一个西方式的政治自由缺口，就会有人把它搞成冲击社会根基的滚滚洪水，导致不用暴力则难以制止的失控局面。作为一个卓越的务实主义者，邓小平比胡耀邦、赵紫阳更加英明、更加果断地在理想和现实之间划出了一道界限：把今天归于现实，把理想留到明天。

　　于是，邓小平做出了他一生之中最痛苦的抉择：壮士断臂——用沉痛、但是可以承担的个人政治代价和政党政治代价，去换取解除那更加沉痛、而且中华民族已经不能再予承担的代价。

　　邓小平的决定引起了极端民主派的深仇大恨，也难以得到欣赏西方式民主自由制度的一部分知识分子的谅解。但是他的决策挽救了中国的经济改革、国内和平和大陆的政治版图完整，挽救了民族的复兴之路。

　　回首“六四”,最重要的是要引以为鉴，把复兴中华的路走得更加理性。

　　极端民主派要做的不是继续制造为他们自己平反的舆论，更不是想方设法地唱衰大陆发展或者在大陆的执政党与民众之间挑拨是非，制造混乱，而是要反省自己在六四学运中的错误主张以及他们对一百余名无辜死难者应付的原罪之责，做一些有利于人民团结和国家发展的建设性工作。

　　中国的执政党更需要吸取教训，要在领导经济发展的同时尽快实现政府的廉洁化和公仆化；要认真倾听民众的声音，倾听反对者的声音，将这两种声音的表达和回应纳入合法的制度化轨道；要在中国探索出一条符合中国国情、在民众接受度和功能有效度方面不低于美国的民主政治道路。

quotes from a movie

Erica:
The more predictable we are, the more vulnerable we are.
I blame instinct and training.
As a mother I know that if someone tried to hurt my son, there's nothing I wouldn't do to stop them.
The next blood that spills is gonna be theirs.
Anna is fighting dirty. We want to win this war; we can't bring knives to a gunfight.
Sometimes you have to lie to people to protect them.
We have to fight them the same way they're fighting us - one step at a time.
That's what Anna does. She takes our emotions...uses it against us.
Anna:
There is no greater incentive for a human male than a damsel in distress.
If we've learned anything is that emotion is weakness. Love is the greatest flaw of humans and our best tool to break them.
While they play politics, we'll take action.
I welcome opposition. It can only strengthen one's agenda.
There will always be obstacles in your way. It's not if you remove them, but how.
Father Jack
Rattlesnakes are God's creatures, too. Doesn't mean they're good for us.
If we're gonna win this war we can't go off the rails. We can't lose sight who we are.

聪明

"身边满是聪明的人－－数学哲学天文外语。但是聪明的人未必是智慧的人。"
--摘自“斯语”
Oh God, Please make me wise enough to know what I want from life.
Oh God, Please make me smart enougth to get what I want from life.
Oh God, Please make me courageous enough to dismiss what others think of me.

What economic policy should China adopt?

Professor Rogoff from Harvard and author of the book This Time is Different, commented that Chinese real estate is facing a burst, which will lead to a nation-wide recession, which will in turn impede regional and global growth. His prediction is based on his extensive research on financial crisis in that every financial crisis is preceded by a run-up in real estate price that is unsustainable, and ultimately leads to a banking crisis and then to a currency crisis. However there is something dubious in his arguments. Though the run-up in real estate prices is a necessary condition for a financial crisis, it is not a sufficient one. His extensive documentation did confirm the former, but not the latter. Thus the fear of a full-blown financial crisis is overly-exaggerated. Second, even if a burst in real estate takes place and leads to a banking crisis, the following links are less concrete and my observation on the subject leads to the conclusion that the burst might be a blessing in disguise, which I will analyse shortly.

Even though the rising real estate price does not justify over-pessimistic forecasting, it should be noted that the distortion in real estate prices has and will impair the efficiency of Chinese economic development. Then how should the central government respond? My prescription differs from many policy makers and economists in that it accepts "cold-therapy" as the optimal way of deal with the bubble. In other words, it turns away from the method of "constraining the bubble" and let price decrease in a gradual way, which might be theoretically appealing, but impossible in practice. Another difference lies in its holistic treatment of three major monetary areas: inflation, exchange rate and over-heating. Here is how it will work:

1. through fiscal policy, monetary policy and administrative policy of command economics, the government should burst the real estate bubble in one stroke.

2. what many feared--NPL (non-performing loans) will take place for sure. The banks will suffer, but the PBC can purchase all these NPL's from the commercial banks by printing money. Meanwhile, the PBC should increase reserve requirement (RR) dramatically to freeze liquidity to prevent possible inflation resulting from increase in money supply. This act will return a healthy balance sheet to commercial banks, which never had that.

3.Inflation should not be curbed to 2%. It could be higher. The reason we fight inflation is that common people's life will be harder because of inflation, but once the real estate price has decreased, the life is much more bearable even with inflation, and with a low housing price, people do not have the need to save that much for housing in the future, as will lead to an increase in domestic demand.

4. Inflation could be beneficial. Assuming relative PPP holds, RMB will face depreciation pressure, relieving it from appreciation pressure. Hot money inflow will decrease, further relieving the PBC's need to sterilize and maintaining an onerous international reserve.

5. Who will get hurt? Speculators' in the real estate market. Fortunately, they are the robber barrons of the country with disproportionate amount of wealth. (They were first from the export industry from Wenzhou, and now the coal mining barrons from the notorious ShanXi province). Thus a negative wealth shock to them will not significantly reduce aggregate demand. Another benefit is to teach the Chinese investors an lesson on risk, which they have forgotten after thirty years of relative calm and stable development. This lesson will be valuable especially if China wish to liberalize its financial sector in the future.

6. Financial Reform MUST be carried out at the same time! With a bail-out, the moral hazard problem must be contained with regulation. "No second bail-out" must be made credible, whether through criminal laws or other way. State for example should refrain from coercing the banks into policy lending through administrative tools. Policy lending can still be carried out, but not through coercion but through more market-oriented ways--like subsidy to lending, or partial insurance on that specific policy lending. This part, I admit, is hard to implement, both because of political reasons but also economic ones.

Chen Guan--the obstacle to Chinese economic development?

A strange phenomenon in China is the concept of Chen Guan, and the controversy surrounding it. From a purely economic point of view, the power and existence of this force stymies the growth of small entrepreneurship in urban areas, which in turn has some serious implications for economic welfare.

The existence of the peddlers and vendors would serve as a cushion for peripheral individuals during the transition period. Utilizing available capital and combining it with some talent and mostly diligence, people without a steady income can maintain a living after income shocks, introduced by such events as massive-layoff during the reforms of state-owned enterprises. The existence of peddlers and vendors in turn assures a cheap market which will further alleviate the economic woes of families confronted with income shocks.

However, abstaining from regulation is not without potential problems. the first concern is the source of the commodities. It has been common for individuals to steal things from the state-owned enterprises and sell them later. However, this concern should not so much an argument against eliminating Chen Guan as an argument for state-owned enterprise's reform.

Second, the concern of the adverse selection. This proposition is odd, concerning the disasters over the food safety regulation in recent years. Food safety regulation is of more importance than the quality control of those small commodities and yet the government has failed to address this problem. The real problem, clearly does not lie in the sales section.

Third, the concern of crowding out "mainstream economic activities". From this point of view, the deregulation of peddlers would lead to an increase in the number of peddlers since the "job" is no longer troubled with risks posed by Chenguan. This change in the relative reward would pose a threat the profitability of shops and department stores. The logic is sound. But whether the possible result pointed out would actually take place depends upon two things 1) the elasticities of the supply of the peddlers 2) the cross elasticities of the peddlers' goods and goods sold in regular stores. Neither of these has available empirical data for us to draw conclusions, though the chances that the worry might come true is indeed good.

Even with this possible consequences, some economists most notably, Prof. Huang in MIT Sloan School of Management argues that the real driving force behind China's development is these small peddlers, instead of those crony capitalists and business tycoons, whose sources of income are questionable at best. he envisions China to be a country of small entrepreneurs. I am not going to analyze his point in detail, but I need to point out that he has put more emphasis upon welfare economics which might not be the preponderant concern of this nation, longing for prosperity. In Clifford Geertz's Peddlers and princes it has been documented that a nation of peddlers can enjoy economic development or near-take-off, but not anything more ambitious. The competitiveness of the nation, might need to be elevated through strategic planning. Once again I am not arguing for the existing government policies, which is inefficient and corrupt. The goals are justified, while the methods needs transformation.

Let me return to the original topic of Chen Guan. I have not reached anything conclusive ,as to whether to eliminate this force, yet. The benefits are clear and desirable and the possible consequences are likely. Even though I do not have enough empirical data to give me a clear calculation result, it is my estimate and intuition that the benefits of curbing this force at least would outweigh the drawbacks, especially when we take non-economic concerns into consideration.

带一本书去巴黎

quoted from my best friend's best friend's blog. I should definitely read this book sometime. Thank you, XX, for recommending me such a wonderful blog

《带一本书去巴黎》给了几个人看了，他们也都写下了异常精彩的篇章。回想自己当初看的时候就说要写下一点什么，始终没有提起精神来认真写下，空余万千思绪在心头。

这两天，看了xx、向子和小猪写的文章，又忍不住留了很长的评论。既然是这样，我想倒不如整理一下这些评论，顺便梳理一下自己的思路，算是留一点积淀。

林达带着他们的《九三年》来到巴黎。巴黎确实是个文化积淀极深的圣地，每一处遗迹背后都有深重的历史。不知道有意还是无意，他们所游历的地方，往往能和大革命前后那段充满争议的岁月联系起来；于是，他们也借机回顾了一下大革命的历史，也顺便道出了他们的思考。

在我看来，法国大革命，其实就是有识之士的改革精神，与民众对现实的不满结合起来的产物。知识分子希望利用民众的力量完成社会变革，却不知道民众的要求远在他们的目的之外，更不知道他们没有能力制约民众的力量。民众的力量被发动以后，革命形势失去控制，知识分子们骑虎难下，裹挟着法兰西走向动荡。相比起那些深受人文主义、启蒙思想熏陶的上层知识分子，下层的民众对于“民主”“变革”只是有个简单而模糊的概念而已；当民众们有机会时，他们只会选择最简单直接的手段——暴力革命——来实现他们的目标。

可能和性格有关，我好像一直都不大喜欢“革命”这个词——这个词通常意味着流血与冲突，甚至是可怕的狂热。很明显，林达对过分狂热的暴力革命不太感冒，而我也正正偏向温和改革。但是，但凡社会改革，总归要有人民的支持才能完成；远离民意的闭门造车式的改革，是注定要失败的。相比起当一个有煽动力的领袖，当一个改革家要更为困难。因为后者，不能任由民意驰骋，不能放任“多数的暴政”；他们总是要当磨心，苦心经营，如履薄冰，一个不小心，就要承受身败业衰的后果，压力是无比巨大的。当然，二者也有一个很不美好的共同点：他们都很有可能为自己的事业付出沉重的代价，比如生命。

自1789年开始，法兰西经历近百年的动荡，无论如何这不能说是一件太好的事。我看到大家的文章貌似都对法国大革命有一点批判，或者说，有一点重新的思考。但是在这里，我却想重申教科书上的观点：法国大革命是一场进步运动。不论如何，法国大革命（包括其后续）推动了法国社会的进步，最终确立了现代国家制度，并且让更多人（包括法国人和其他国家地区的人）的思想得以进步。为了推动社会进步，在不同的时刻，社会可能需要不同方式的变革，而不论这种方式是暴力革命或是温和改革，都是最终必须推进的，这里面有一定的历史必然性。所以，改革和革命本身其实并无高下之分，关键只是在于如何选择，以及如何将变革对社会的危害减到最低。

小猪将文革与法国大革命联系起来了。是的，这两个时代的人民的精神状态，确实有相似之处。这种狂热，来源于民众对革命、对社会的不认识。人类本身一点都不高贵，只有有思想力的人，并能用理性指导行动的人，才应当是社会的尺度。因此，思想的革命，必须是社会革命的先导。

写到这里，我想我们的同龄人们（乃至其他的一些人）也应该从中看到一点什么。我很少看到我的同龄人们赞同文革的那种狂热状态的，却是经常看到他们对他人、对社会发出偏激的、霸道的意见。如果我们总是以偏激的态度看待一切，我们又和那些历史中我们不认可的人有什么不同呢？千万不要做落在猪身上的乌鸦。学会平和与妥协，是真正的成熟。

大家也有联系到中国的民主法制发展，但是我不想讲这一部分。总觉得那有违我的初衷；而且，这种联系未必一定很恰当。一千个人心中有一千个哈姆雷特。看同一本书，大家有不同的感悟，互相交流产生思想的沟通与碰撞，是相当美好的一件事。也说到了，每个人都可以自由地以理性的方式表达意见，并且每个人都尊重其他人以理性方式表达的意见，这才可以造就民主。

最后鸣谢xx、向子和小猪，是你们督促了我这个懒鬼，做一点有益的思考。

Illusion and Disillusion--Change of sino-Us relationship

Almost all websites display news on the debate of exchange rate of RMB to Us dollar. Almost all western media, led by Paul Krugmna attacked Chinese "exchange rate manipulation". all western media ridicule the response of Chinese prime minister Wen. They conclude that China is becoming less cooperative with its gaining of power. Is that the reality?

The truth is China is getting disillusioned by the acts of US. For years, China has been soft diplomatically toward US, taking almost accomodating stances toward US foreign policy, not much complaint when US foreign policy threatened its own interest. It culminated when Jiang Zemin when asked about US military deployment in Asia, commented : China welcomes US involvement. China did not confront US in the hope that US would later take a less confrontational attitude toward China. It is within asian philosophy that when someone is antagonistic toward you, bear it without complaint, the other side will change with time. This is clearly NOT happening. With time, Us has taken this non-confrontation as acquiesce. Continued arm-sale to Taiwan, unfair comments on Tibet (where CIA was heavily involved in the past), and all other small provocation never stopped. I read millions of media coverage on China, which make doubt if I were ever in China the year before. The distortion is beyond imagination and it seems the yellow journalism were everywhere. Chinese leaders may be getting disillusioned, perhaps, that confrontation is all that it can expect from US. Then why should China continue taking an accomodating stance? Absolutely no reason.

Moreover, many western people viewed Chinese exchange rate as outraging and they deem it disobedient of China not to follow what the US suggest--revalue.

Is RMB undervalued? the answer will come soon. but first look at the history.

In 1997, US treasury "advised" China to devalue RMB drasticallty. China refused. Ensuing were flooding comments ridiculing Chines foolhardy attempt to keep RMB strong.

For the more than 10 years that followed, RMB barely depreciated IN REAL TERMS. and in the recent years, it has offset all its depreciation with more conspicuous appreciation, though not enough to satisfy Americans. The puzzle is, a currency that thought need to be devalued, how come it suddenly become undervalued, without any depreciation (improved economic development has been adjusted with REAL term calculation)?

Economists point to the fact that China has such a huge reserve. This is as convincing as economists pointed out that high inflation keep unemployment low in the past. We still understand so little of economics to get a conclusive answer. And Partial answers can be ridiculously wrong--just like philips curve. Having listened to a political economy professor from Brown, I now understand more about this. The reserve exist simply because of America limit what China can import. China wants to buy high-tech machines to replace its own crap at home, but America will not let it. It is just like there are two people, A buys from B freely, but will not let B buy what he wants. Isn't it then ridiculous for A to complain that B will simply not buy from A? People point to PPP. another crap. The sample is problematic at best and I do not want to get into that detail now. And the crap with tradeable and nontradeable. How we draw the line makes a difference. Is the high-tech machine tradable?

Why should China listen to US on its OWN monetary policy, anyway? Let's suppose China did. before 1997, US and World Bank advised that it is inefficient for China to keep so much reserve. Suppose China listened, then when aisian financial crisis hurt, China would need IMF too. then it will have to devalue like Korea. then in 2010, China will again to revalue. Without depreciation in 1997, China is asked to revalue 20% minimum now. Imagine a drastic depreciation in 1997. Chinese RMB will be so volatile that will decimate its trade sector, esp. with its crappy financial sector. Then China will no longer be talked about by ECON students as an example of "growth miracle" but instead will be analysed as " growth disaster" For now, it might be just "diplomatic disaster"? But who cares? It is the life of its domestic people the leaders should care, not those people, trying to find a scapegoat frenetically.